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Suppose you were running late to work and had to decide which route to take that 
would give you the best chance of getting to work on time. How do you come up with 
the various routes to consider? How do you assess which route will give you the best 
chance of getting to work on time?  In order to make that decision, you may think 
about all the prior routes you’ve taken and then evaluate each one with some 
probability of getting the desired outcome.  On the surface, the act of generating 
choices and evaluating their likelihood may seem to have little in common.  However, 
one may be surprised to learn that these processes are closely intertwined.  The 
findings from this project suggest that judgments of likelihood may be constrained by 
one’s ability to retrieve from semantic memory.  In experiment 1, we demonstrate 
that one’s general ability to retrieve from long-term memory (LTM) may play a 
critical role in judgments of likelihood and that the nature of the retrieval may relate 




different measurement models of memory and find that the type of relation between 
memory and judgment changes as the function of the type of memory model that one 
adopts.  Finally, combined data across both experiments reveal that how the to-be-
judged items are distributed plays a role in judgments and that retrieval ability, 
specifically, semantic memory, is predictive of probability judgments.  Taken 
together, we argue that the ability to retrieve from LTM plays a critical role in 
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Chapter 1: Grounding Judgment Phenomena in Memory 
Probability Judgments and Subadditivity 
 One common finding in the judgment and decision making literature is that 
people often overestimate probability judgments, and one form of this overestimation 
is known as subadditivity.  Subadditivity is the tendency for the probability of an 
event to be rated as less than the sum of its implicit or unpacked parts.  For example, 
imagine that you received a basket of food that contained fruits, vegetables, and 
desserts and are asked, “What is the probability that when you reach into that basket, 
that you will grab a piece of fruit?1 Let P stand for your subjective probability, F 
stands for fruit, V stands for vegetables, and D stand for desserts. The sum of your 
subjective probabilities, P(F) + P(V) + P(D), should total to 100.  However, research 
has shown that subjective probabilities usually sum to be much greater than 100, 
making the objective probability subadditive to one’s subjective probability.    
 Tversky and Kahneman were one of the first to call attention to this 
phenomena and argued that these systematic errors in the judged probability of an 
event were a result of the explicitness of its description (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983). Tversky and Koehler proposed a theoretical framework, Support Theory, to 
explain how these different descriptions of the same event can give rise to the biases 
seen in judged probability (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). In order to test this theory, 
they designed a series of experiments where they had participants evaluate the 
probability of an event, given a scenario.  For example, participants were told that 
                                                 




nearly 2 million people from the United States die from different causes.  They were 
then asked to estimate the probability of death for various causes. Finding substantial 
subadditivity in probability judgments, they argued that this bias was due to the 
judgments being attached not to the event itself, but rather, to the description attached 
to the event. Specifically, they believed that the more descriptive or detailed the 
event, the more its perceived likelihood increases (Tversky & Koehler, 1994).  In 
other words, when participants estimate the probabilities of causes, the magnitude of 
their subadditivity depends on the explicitness of the scenario. This is because of the 
lack of consideration of alternative or unavailable events is the fundamental issue of 
probability judgment biases. Thus, if one wished to make probability judgments that 
did not violate normative theory, one needs to fully unpack all alternative events.   
The notion that the unpacking of alternative events is critical to the evaluation 
of the focal event’s likelihood reveals a critical assumption.  This assumption is that 
probability judgments are made by comparing the strength of a focal hypothesis2 with 
the strength of a set of alternatives. In other words, probability judgments are 
assumed to engage the judger in a comparison process (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 
1999; Tversky & Koehler, 1994).  To make this more concrete, we can go back to the 
produce basket example. The probability of grabbing a piece of fruit (P(F)) is your 
current focal hypothesis or the likelihood you are assessing.  The alternative 
hypotheses, or states of the world, would be the probability of grabbing vegetables 
and desserts, (P(V) + P(D)).   In order to make a probability judgment, you would 
                                                 





need to compare the evidence of grabbing a piece of fruit to the evidence of grabbing 
a vegetable and dessert.  That is, you are comparing the likelihood of one state of the 
world to the likelihood of the other states of the world.  This is in contrast to 
frequency judgments (“How many pieces of fruit are in the produce basket?”) which 
do not involve a comparison process, but rather, are judged by the familiarity or 
strength of the focal event, in this case, fruit, only (Hintzman, 1984, 1988). Thus, the 
estimate that you give to your focal hypothesis depends on the degree to which you 
consider your alternatives.   
Judgments and Hypothesis Generation 
 The work that was done by Tversky and Koehler, in conjunction with the 
notion that probability judgments involve a comparison process, have a couple of 
implications: 1) that the generation of alternatives plays a critical role to the 
assessment of the focal event, and 2) if one wished to understand the systematic 
errors in probability judgments, one needs to understand the process of how the 
generation of alternatives occurs. This is exactly what Gettys and Fisher sought out to 
do in one of their studies (Gettys & Fisher, 1979). They designed an experiment 
where participants were asked to generate a set of plausible hypotheses for a series of 
data that were presented one datum at a time.  For example, participants were 
presented with tools used by a plumber and asked to come up with plausible 
occupations on the basis of these tools.  When the first tool was presented, 
participants gave a set of plausible occupations and were asked to rate the plausibility 
of each occupation.  For each trial, after a new tool was presented, they were asked to 




then allowed to generate new hypotheses and drop old ones. The presentation of the 
data was manipulated such that the first three were consistent with an alternative 
hypothesis, and the last three data points were chosen to be less consistent with the 
alternative hypothesis. This was done in order to encourage the generation of new 
hypotheses.  In other words, the experiment was designed such that the hypothesis 
consistency of the data decreased the plausibility of the initial hypothesis set.   
What Gettys and Fisher found was that the active generation of hypotheses 
was greatly influenced by the subjective assigned probability of the current 
hypothesis set being considered.  Specifically, new hypotheses were triggered when 
the plausibility of the current hypothesis set decreased.  In light of the new data 
presented in trial N, participants were more likely to generate a new hypothesis if the 
assessed plausibility of the hypothesis set given on N-1 trial decreased. Further, 
Gettys and Fisher were interested in understanding the threshold of which triggered 
the addition of a new hypothesis. Examining the data from trials 2-6, they found that 
new hypotheses were added if they were at least half as likely as the best hypothesis.  
Thus, participants appeared to use plausibility estimates in the hypothesis generation 
process.  
This leads to an interesting question.  Given a set of data, why would 
participants not consider all possible alternatives as opposed to employing some sort 
of plausibility heuristic? Gettys and Fisher believed that the process of hypothesis 
generation could be modeled as a highly specific recursive memory search (Gettys & 
Fisher, 1979).  In searching for some other possible factors that could play into the 




certain number of hypotheses at a time and that the number of hypotheses that one 
could consider could be constrained by the individual’s own memory limitations.  
Specifically, the data seemed to suggest that as the number of hypotheses in the 
current hypothesis set approaches the individual’s memory limitations, the quality or 
probability of the new hypothesis to be included was much stricter. This is crucial 
because the implications are that the number of alternatives and the likelihoods 
associated with them can be a function of one’s own memory capacity.  
The Role of Memory in Hypothesis Generation 
 More recently, Thomas et al. proposed HyGene, a model of hypothesis 
generation and probability judgment rooted in memory (Thomas, Dougherty, 
Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008). This model demonstrates that several systematic errors 
and phenomena in the decision making literature, including subadditivity, could be 
accounted for by assuming that basic memory processes are what constrains 
hypothesis generation.  HyGene describes how data extracted from the environment 
are used to generate hypotheses from memory and how these hypotheses are used to 
make probability judgments and frame subsequent information search.  In accordance 
with Gettys and Fishers’ work, the overall idea of HyGene is that a limited working 
memory capacity system would lead to an impoverished set of hypothesis.  In turn, 
the impoverished set of hypotheses manifests themselves into systematic errors in 
probability judgment and subsequent information search.  
 In HyGene, the subadditivity phenomenon is made explicit through the model.  
When making a probability judgment, the set of alternative hypotheses one is able to 




Several findings purportedly support this mechanism. For example, individual 
differences in WM capacity were positively correlated with the number of alternative 
hypotheses one was able to consider (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a).  Additionally, the 
degree of subadditivity has been shown to be negatively correlated with performance 
on working memory (WM) tasks. Because WM capacity is linked to the ability to 
maintain task-relevant information in the focus of attention, these findings suggest 
that the number of alternative hypotheses that one is able to actively consider is 
constrained by the limits of their WM.  Thus, those with higher WM capacity are able 
to consider more alternatives than those with low capacity. What follows is that 
individuals who perform well on WM tasks are less subadditive.  This is because they 
are less likely to overestimate the likelihood of the focal hypothesis when the set of 
comparisons (alternatives) are more complete (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a, 2003b; 
Sprenger et al., 2011; Sprenger & Dougherty, 2006).   
 These findings notwithstanding, it is important to note that processes of WM 
and retrieval are intertwined.  While the focus of HyGene’s explanation of biases in 
probability judgment has been on WM, what is brought into WM must necessarily be 
retrieved from LTM.  Thus, findings showing correlations between judgment and 
WM may occur because of individual differences in retrieval, not because of one's 
WM capacity.  Additionally, some work shows that LTM retrieval is important for 
determining the degree of subadditivity in probability judgment (Sprenger et al., 
2011).  In a series of experiments, Sprenger et al (2011) investigated the impact of 
divided attention (DA) during encoding and at retrieval on probability judgments.  




LTM, and thus, one’s recall performance, Sprenger et al predicted that disturbances 
during encoding would lead to one generating less alternative hypotheses.  Thus, 
disturbances during encoding should also lead to increases in judgment magnitude.  
In order to investigate this, they designed an experiment where participants were 
placed in either a high or low cognitive load condition and attention was divided 
during encoding.  As predicted, they found that those in the high cognitive load 
condition recalled fewer alternative hypotheses when compared to those in the low 
cognitive load group.  Further, the overall magnitude of their probability judgments 
was larger.  In a separate experiment where attention was divided at retrieval at four 
different cognitive load levels, they still found a positive correlation between 
cognitive load and judgment magnitude. However, the effect of DA on probability 
judgments during retrieval was much smaller than the effect of DA during encoding.  
While much of the prior focus has been on the limitations of WM, these findings 
suggest that errors and biases in the initial storage of information can cascade into 
errors and biases in judged probability by degrading the retrievability of learned 
alternatives.   
Chapter 2: Current Study 
For probability judgments, the focus has been on how one’s WM capacity 
limits the number of hypotheses one can focus on at any given point in time.   In 
contrast, frequency judgments seem to rely on heuristics such as availability and 
representativeness.  The overarching goal of the current study is to gain insights as to 




variation in probability judgments.  The study will assess individuals’ performance in 
measures of WM and LTM in order to examine its relation variations in probability 
and frequency judgments.  In order to test this, participants will learn a distribution of 
the to-be-judged items and be asked to make probability judgments on half of the 
items and frequency judgments on the other half.  Participants will then complete a 
battery of memory tasks that measure the constructs of WM capacity and retrieval 
from LTM.  
Additionally, a study design that allows for contrasting expectations between 
the two judgments types will be used in order to compare them. Recall that a driving 
difference in the cognitive processes for each judgment types is that probability 
judgments involve a comparison process, whereas frequency judgments do not.  
Taking advantage of that notion, it should not be surprising that the distribution of the 
strength of the items to which the focal item is compared, would influence its 
likelihood estimate for probability judgments. This finding, known as the alternative-
outcomes effect, is exactly what Windschitl et al found. The distribution of the 
strength of the alternatives influenced the perceived strength of the focal hypothesis 
(Windschitl, 2002; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  Specifically, within probability 
judgments, the magnitude of probability judgments on items are evenly distributed 
tend to be higher when compared to the judgments on items that are unevenly 
distributed (Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  Theoretically, this paradigm is suitable for 
the present study because in the context of memory, not considering an alternative 




impoverished set of alternatives’ strengths, and thus, the consequent is a greater 
overestimation of the focal item.  
Questions and Hypotheses  
Central to this study are the following core questions and hypotheses.   
 
Question 1: Is there evidence of the comparison process for probability judgments 
and lack of one for frequency judgments?   
Hypothesis 1. First, in regards to judgment type, we expect to replicate the 
alternative-outcomes effect for probability judgments. Specifically, that the overall 
magnitude of the sum of probability judgments for items that are evenly distributed 
should be higher than the overall magnitude of the sum of probability judgments for 
items that are unevenly distributed.  However, we do not expect this relationship to 
hold when it comes to frequency judgments because they do not involve a 
comparison process. Thus, the distribution of the alternatives should not play a role in 
frequency estimation. 
Question 2: What is the relation between each judgment type and memory ability?  
Hypothesis 2. In regards to probability judgments, we hypothesize that those who 
perform better on measures of retrieval from LTM will be less subadditive when 
compared to those who do not perform as well. Further, we expect this relationship to 
still hold when controlling for individual differences in WM.  Thus, for probability 
judgments, we expect there to be a negative relation with WM and RA.  
Hypothesis 3. In regards to frequency judgments, we expect a positive relationship 
between RA and frequency judgments. This is because historically, frequency 




participant recollects specific instances (Brown, 1995, 1997) or estimates the 
frequency of occurrence based on memory factors such as familiarity and availability 
(Hintzman, 1984, 1988, Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974).  Further, we expect to 
find no relationship between WM and frequency judgments.  A prior study found no 
relation between WM capacity and frequency judgments (Sprenger & Dougherty, 
2006).  This makes sense theoretically because frequency judgments do not involve a 
comparison process and thus, there is no reason to believe that their estimates would 
relate to working memory.   
Experiments 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examined how individual differences in WM and retrieval from LTM 
(retrieval ability or RA) relate to the variation in both probability and frequency 
judgments. Within each judgment type, the frequency of presentation for the to-be-
judged items was manipulated such that half of the to-be-judged items were evenly 
distributed and the other half were unevenly distributed.  To see how these judgments 
relate to memory ability, a battery of memory tests were administered.  Composites 
representing both memory abilities were then used as predictors to test the core 
hypotheses using a model comparison approach.  Finally, exploratory factor analyses 
were conducted to further understand the latent memory structures themselves and 





 The purpose of experiment 2 was to see if the findings from experiment 1 
were replicable.  Findings from experiment 1 suggest that a 3-factor memory model 
may be better when compared to a 2-factor memory model.  Thus, additional 
measures were added in order to develop both WM and RA at the construct level, by 
parsing RA up into semantic and episodic memory.  Four different measurement 
models of memory are assessed.  Finally, in addition to hypotheses testing using 
Bayesian model comparison, a latent variables modeling approach will be used to 
provide converging evidence in understanding the relation between different aspects 
of memory and different types of judgments.   
Combined Data Analysis 
 The purpose of combined data analysis was to add additional power and to re-
evaluate the central hypotheses. Further, the robustness of the findings from both 
experiments 1 and 2 was evaluated by analyzing the data through different memory 
models.  Finally, model utility was assessed and parameter estimates were obtained. 
Chapter 3: General Data Analysis Methods and Approach 
This section discusses the general approach used in evaluating the a priori hypotheses 
or predictions.  Methods for conducting exploratory analyses are reported in the 
respective study’s analysis section.  Information specific to the analysis of a particular 





 Hypothesis testing was done using a Bayes factor model comparisons. Bayes 
factors were used in order to evaluate the strength of evidence for or against the 
alternative model over the null model, which is typically a model with no predictors. 
Bayes factors can be interpreted as the odds of one model over the other.  For 
example, a Bayes factor of 3 represents a 3 to 1 odds in favor of the alternative model 
over the null model. Bayes factors are interpreted on a continuum, with support for 
the null model given by values less than one and values greater than one providing 
support for the alternative. The degree of support is indexed by the extremity of the 
BF with greater support for the null given for values that approach zero and greater 
support for the alternative given by values that approach infinity. Typically, it is 
generally accepted that BFs above 3 provide evidence for the alternative model and 
that BFs below 0.33 provide evidence for the null model.  BFs between 0.33-3 are 
generally viewed as inconclusive (Kass & Raftery, 1995). For each model of interest, 
the directionality of the parameters of interest will be reported by the Pearson’s 
correlation.  
 Finally, for the current experiment, the null model always included the 
participant as a random factor because of the within-subjects design.  This will allow 
for the evaluation of a particular model (or the inclusion of a predictor in a model) on 
the variance of the dependent variable, over and beyond the nuisance factor of 
individual differences. For models which focus on just one judgment type (probability 




 In general, model comparison or selection typically tells one which model best 
fits the data relative to the other models of which it is compared.  However, the utility 
of a model lies in its predictive quality.  If a model has high predictive quality, then 
the new data predicted from the model fitted with the observed data should be similar 
to one another.  This can be conceptualized as the model’s ability to predict 
unobserved data. Because we are interested in the predictive nature of the data-model 
fit, cross-validation will be performed. This will be done alongside the general 
recommended model selection and checking practices (Gelman et al., 2014; Gill, 
2015; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013; Levy & Mislevy, 2016; Lynch, 2007).  
Latent Variables Approach 
 Because the focus of the study is about one’s general memory ability and not 
about individual task level performance, composites were formed to represent these 
latent constructs. Composites were formed by first transforming each task’s outcome 
variable to a z-score. The z-scores of the intended composites were then added and 
then divided by the total number of tasks used to measure that construct. If a 
participant did not complete one of the tasks used in forming the composite, then the 
individual had a missing data point for the composite and thus, was not included in 
any analysis that used the construct. 
Chapter 4: Experiment 1 
The purpose of experiment 1 was to examine how one’s retrieval ability relates to 






Students from the University of Maryland were recruited from the university’s online 
research sign-up program and given course credit for participating.  The sample size 
was determined, a priori, to be 128 total. This total was based on similar studies in the 
literature. Thus, data were collected until each counterbalancing condition met at least 
8 participants.   
Design 
A 2 x 2 within subjects randomized block factorial design was used.  The two factors 
were the type of judgment (probability vs frequency) and the to-be-judged items’ 
distribution (even vs uneven).  The manipulation of distribution was done such that 
within each judgment type, half of the frequency of presentation of the to-be-judged 
were evenly distributed (30, 15, 15, 15, 15) and the other half were unevenly 
distributed (45, 30, 5, 5, 5).  The item frequencies were based off prior studies which 
also used the alternative-outcomes paradigm.  Note that the total number of total 
presentations (trials) for each subcategory was the same (90). Thus, the only 
difference between the subcategories was the frequency with which each item was 
presented.  The assignment of the to-be-judged items’ sub-categories to each 
distribution type, the order of making each type of judgment (frequency or probability 
first), and order of which distribution appeared first when making judgments within a 
judgment type, were all counterbalanced.  This resulted in 16 possible 




the controlling of individual differences between subjects.  Additionally, the order of 
the tasks within the memory battery was randomly generated per participant prior to 
data collection.   
Procedure 
Participants came into the lab and completed the study visit in one 2 hour testing 
session.  During their visit, participants went through exemplar training where they 
learned the distribution of the to-be-judged items.  Following learning, they made 
probability and frequency estimates on those items.  To understand how WM and RA 
relate to the variation in judgments, participants completed a battery of memory tasks 
commonly used to measure WM and LTM.  Working memory was assessed by using 
two complex span tasks, operation span and symmetry span.  The ability to retrieve 
from LTM was assessed by three tasks: delayed free recall, category fluency, and 
experience fluency. Specific details of these measures are described in the 
MEASURES section below. Finally, participants completed a memory free recall task 
on the items they made judgments on at the end of the visit.    
Measures 
All tasks, with the exception of the working memory tasks, were programmed with 
PsychoPy version 1.82.01.  The working memory tasks were obtained from the 
Attention & Working Memory Lab at the Georgia Institute of Technology (Unsworth, 
Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) and were presented in E-Prime. No modifications 




Assessing Probability and Frequency Judgments 
The judgment task consisted of three phases: a learning phase, a probability judgment 
phase, and a frequency judgment phase.  Prior to each phase, participants practiced 
with items from a practice category.   
Learning Phase.  The learning phase consisted of 360 trials where the participants 
learned the distribution of 20 unique items.  The 20 items were evenly split between 
two categories: tools and clothing.  These categories were further split into 2 sub-
categories, hats and shoes for clothing, and cooking tools and carpentry tools for 
tools.  This resulted in each sub-category containing 5 items, bringing the total 
number of items to 20.  Each category represented a judgment type (frequency or 
probability) and each sub-category represented a distribution type (even or uneven).  
Thus, participants had to learn two distribution types (even and uneven) per category 
(tools and clothing).   
At the beginning of the learning phase, participants were presented with the following 
scenario:  
“Now, imagine that you have two strange and wealthy friends who like to 
send you gifts. One friend always sends gifts of tools, which would either be a 
cooking tool or a carpentry tool.  The other friend always sends gifts of 
clothing, which would either be a pair of shoes and or a hat. After opening 
each package, you repack and throw it onto separate piles (cooking tools, 
carpentry tools, hats, or shoes) in your garage.  Just as you practiced, you will 
see a series of packages, first with a picture indicating whether it is a package 




will open so you will see what item is inside, and you will automatically move 
on to the next package.”  
One learning trial (an opening of a package) contained three pieces of information for 
the participant: the category of the item, the sub-category of the item, and the 
particular item itself.  Each piece of information was presented in a form of an image 
with an appropriate text label.  The presentation of the category contained an image 
of a generic brown package with the appropriate label (either tools or clothing).  
Images for sub-categories consisted of a chef’s hat labeled “cooking” for cooking 
tools, a red toolbox labeled “carpentry” for carpentry tools, an empty shoebox labeled 
“shoes” for shoes, and a hat rack labeled “hats” for hats.  The timing of the 
presentation was done so that the category information was presented for 100ms in 
the center top half of the computer screen, followed by the addition of the sub-
category and particular package item for 200 ms, in the bottom left and right of the 
computer screen, respectively.   
A surprise recall task was incorporated into the learning phase such that, on average, 
on 20% of the trials were followed by the surprise recall.  The purpose of including 
this was to encourage participants to pay attention while learning the distributions of 
the to-be-judged items.  During a surprise recall trial, participants were asked to type 
in either the last subcategory or the last particular item they opened. Approximately 
half of the recall trials asked about the last subcategory of the item the participant 
opened, with the other half asking about the last particular item the participant 
opened.  Participants were instructed on how to complete these recall tasks prior to 




Judgment Phase. After learning the distributions of the 20 items, subjects proceeded 
to the judgment phase.  Participants were reminded that they now had four piles of 
gifts in their garage (the four sub-categories) and that they were all repackaged.  They 
were to imagine that they now had a need for one of the items, but since they are 
repackaged, the participant would need to go to a particular pile and randomly select 
a package.  
Probability Judgments.  For probability judgments, participants were asked, “Of all 
the different types of [sub-category] you received, what percentage were of 
[particular item]?”  Participants were instructed to use a number between 0 and 100, 
with 0% meaning there was no chance that the box contains item [particular item], 
100% meaning that it was certain that the box contains item [particular item], and 
50% is equivalent to the likelihood of a coin flip landing on heads instead of tails.   
Frequency Judgments. For frequency judgments, participants were asked “How many 
packages of [particular item] did you receive?”   
To make the judgments, participants typed their answers into a text box, pressed the 
enter key, and then moved onto the next judgment item. Again, the order of which 
judgment was made first (probability or frequency) was determined by their 
counterbalancing condition number.  Further, the order in which participants made 
judgments of the particular items within a sub-category (distribution) was randomized 
per participant so that they could not use deduction to answer judgment items.   
Assessing Working Memory 
Working memory capacity is seen as the ability to maintain task-relevant information 




done by asking participants to complete complex span tasks, which require 
participants to perform two tasks, a processing component and a memory component,  
at the same time.  The memory component contains varying levels of difficulty (set 
size). Participants first go through and practice each task separately before performing 
them at the same time.  During that phase, the processing task is interweaved with the 
memory component.  The particular type of task is specified below, under each 
complex span task section.  Finally, participants are told that it is important that they 
obtain at least an 85% accuracy on the processing component throughout the task.  
The current study used a shortened version of the two complex span tasks. This was 
due to study visit time constraints and to consider possible participant fatigue.  The 
shortened complex span tasks were developed by Oswald and colleagues (Oswald, 
Mcabee, Redick, & Hambrick, 2014) and obtained, with permission, from the 
Attention & Working Memory Lab at the Georgia Institute of Technology (Unsworth 
et al., 2005).  Prior assessment of the reliability of the shortened versions reveals that 
they contributed similarly to the standard version’s ability to measure WM capacity in 
addition to predicting general fluid-intelligence (Foster et al., 2015).   
For the working memory tasks described below, there are typically two types of 
outcome scores that one could use, a total score and a partial score.  The total score 
requires that the participant recalls each item within a sub-trial correctly in order to 
count, where the partial score counts each particular recall instance as either correct 
or incorrect.  In this experiment, the participant’s final partial scores were used as the 




typically has more variance and consequently, allows for better discrimination 
between high and low ability participants (Conway, Kane, & Al, 2005). 
 Operation Span. Participants were asked to memorize the letters presented on the 
screen in the correct order while solving math problems in between the presentation 
of the letters. The math problem was presented such that the participant would see the 
equation and once solved, they clicked the mouse and were presented with a number 
and had to indicate whether this number was the correct solution by selecting TRUE 
or FALSE.  Following their selection, a letter would be presented on the screen.  The 
number of alternating math problems and letters varied per block. After a certain 
number of alternating math problems and letters were presented, a recall screen 
appeared and participants were asked to select the letters that were presented in the 
correct order.   
Symmetry Span.  Participants were asked to memorize the location of the colored 
square within a matrix, in the correct order while solving symmetry problems.  
Participants first saw a large matrix of black and white squares. Once participants 
determined whether the image was symmetric about the vertical axis, they clicked on 
the mouse.  On the following screen, the participant selected YES or NO to whether 
the image was symmetrical.  After answering the question, participants were 
presented with a 4x4 matrix where one of the squares were colored red.  After a 
certain number of alternating symmetry problems and colored squares, participants 
saw a screen containing a blank 4x4 matrix asking them to select the squares in the 




Assessing Retrieval Ability  
The assessment of the ability to retrieve from long-term memory was done using 
fluency tasks and memory recall tasks. Fluency tasks as participants to generate as 
many words as they can within a specified amount of time, within a particular 
category. Performance on fluency tasks is typically used as an index of one’s 
semantic memory.  Retrieval tasks, in particular, from LTM, differ from complex 
span or short-term memory tasks in that there is a set delay that occurs between the 
learning of the items that are to be retrieved and the recall of those items.  These tasks 
are commonly used in the memory literature.   
For this particular experiment, the latent variable of interest is retrieval ability.  The 
differentiation between the nature (semantic or episodic) of retrieval was not of 
interest here. In other words, the goal was to assess general retrieval ability from 
LTM, regardless of the nature of the type of the retrieval process.   
Category Fluency.  For category fluency, participants were presented with four 
categories, one at a time, and given 2 minutes to generate as many words as they 
could that belonged to that particular category.  Words were typed into a text box that 
was presented on the computer screen.  Participants were given a practice trial to 
ensure they understood how to type in the answers.  The order of the experimental 
categories was randomized for each participant. The categories of the Category 
Fluency task were standard from the literature (sports, animals, fruits). The practice 
category was vegetables.  The average total of the unique words retrieved over the 




Experience Fluency.  The experience fluency task was created as a variant to the 
category fluency Task.  Because category fluency has been cited as measuring 
fluency from memory that is more semantic in nature, the experience fluency task 
was created to draw from memory could be more episodic in nature.  Again, this was 
done because the main interest of experiment 1 was to look at one’s general ability to 
retrieve from LTM.  The episodic variant was created by presenting categories to 
participants that theoretically could be more episodic in nature.  The categories were 
naming items that typically go into a backpack, universities/colleges, and female first 
names.  The practice category was naming types of relatives.  The instructions for this 
task was the same as the category fluency task, with the exception that participants 
were allowed to use proper nouns such as names of people and places.  Assessment of 
this variant is discussed in the Exploratory Analysis section.   The average total of the 
unique words retrieved over the three blocks was used as the dependent variable. 
Delayed Free Recall.  In the delayed free recall task, participants learned a list of 20 
words, with each word presented for 2 seconds at a time. After learning the list of the 
words, they performed a distractor task and then proceeded to recall as many words 
as they could, in any order, from the list they had just learned.  The time participants 
had to recall words was 2 minutes.  In regards to the distractor task, participants were 
required to determine whether a set of colored squares, presented briefly on the 
computer screen, matched the current set of colored squares.  There were a total of 3 
blocks, with each block containing 4 trials. The four trials differed in the number of 
squares presented (2, 4, 6, and 8). The time for participants to respond was fixed so 




27 seconds for each participant.  The entire sequence was repeated 3 times. The 
average total number of correct words recalled over the three learned lists were used 
as the dependent variable.   
Assessing Recall of the To-Be-Judged Items 
Finally, after the completion of the memory battery, participants completed the 
Judgment Recall task last. Participants were informed that they would now be asked 
to recall the items that they had made judgments on at the beginning of their study 
visit.  During the task, participants were prompted with each of the four categories, 
one at a time, and then given 45 seconds to recall the items that belonged to that 
particular category.  The total number of correct items recalled per judgment and 
distribution type were used as dependent variables.   
Analysis 
Coding of Variables & Constructs 
Judgments.  Each participant had 10 frequency judgments and 10 probability 
judgments, with half of each judgment type coming from either an even or uneven 
distribution.  To examine subadditivity, the total sum of the participant’s judgments 
were used, per sub-category.  Thus, each participant had a total of 4 judgment sums 
(frequency even, frequency uneven, probability even, and probability uneven).  To 
compare the two types of judgments, frequency judgments were re-scaled to be on the 
range of 0-100 by dividing the estimates by the total number of times that item was 




Memory Abilities.  WM ability was represented by average the z-scores of the two 
working memory tasks and RA ability was represented by averaging the z-scores of 
the two fluency tasks and the delayed free recall task.  Additionally, the 
recommendation for complex span tasks is to only use data from participants who 
performed at 85% or above.  However, the approach here is similar to robustness 
analysis.  For this project, a second dataset was created to only include participants 
who met performance criteria.  WM and RA composite then were re-calculated. Thus, 
for all analysis with WM or RA as predictors, a comparable model was run using the 
data from only participants who met criteria on the complex span tasks.  
Missing Data 
Analysis will include data from all participants who have data on the predictors of 
interest within each hypothesis test.   If a participant did not complete a task that was 
used in forming a composite or latent factor, they were not included in the analysis 
that has that composite or latent variable in the model.   
Outliers and Robustness Analysis 
For each experiment, a correlation matrix of the variables and their probabilistic 
moments will be reported in the appendix.  Logit transformation was done on 
proportion data. No other transformations were done on the data.  Additionally, in 
order to ensure that the findings did not rely on extreme values and to evaluate the 
robustness of the findings, analyses were conducted on a dataset where potential 
outliers were removed.  Outliers were first identified by finding those whose data 




removed from the dataset and the composited were re-calculated.  Because of the 
performance criteria for WM tasks mentioned previously, this resulted in each 
hypothesis being evaluated with 4 variants of the dataset: 1) a full dataset, 2) a dataset 
with only those who met performance criteria on the WM tasks, 3) a dataset with 
potential outliers removed, 4) a dataset with potential outliers removed and who only 
met performance criteria.   
Software 
Descriptives and Bayesian model comparison were conducted in R version 3.4.2. 
Exploratory factor analyses were conducted using SPSS version 24 and MPLUS 
version 7. 
Results 
Final Analysis Sample and Demographics 
One-hundred forty-two University of Maryland undergraduates (mean age = 19.16 ± 
2.68, 106 females) completed the study.  Out of the 142 participants who completed 
the study, 6 participants had missing data on one or more of the tasks.  Out of those 6 
participants, 5 were missing data on a task used to form a composite.  However, all 
analysis will include all participants that have data on the predictors of interest.  Thus, 
the final main analysis will include 137-142 participants (103 females, mean age = 
19.16 ± 2.68).  The total number of participants for the dataset containing only those 
who met performance criteria on working memory measures was 118.  The number of 




participants in the dataset with potential outliers removed and who also met 
performance criteria on working memory measures was 112.   
Descriptives 
A correlation matrix of the judgments, composite memory abilities, and task variables 
are located in the appendix.    
Question 1 
Is there evidence of the comparison process for probability judgments and lack of one 
for frequency judgments?   
The primary hypothesis of interest was whether judgment magnitude varied as a 
function of judgment type and distribution. I hypothesized that the overall magnitude 
of the sum of judgments for items that are evenly distributed should be higher than 
the overall magnitude of the sum of probability judgments for items that are unevenly 
distributed.  However, I do not expect the distribution of the alternatives to play a role 
in frequency judgments because they do not involve a comparison process.  Thus, the 
expectation is that there should be a main effect of judgment type and a meaningful 
interaction between distribution and judgment type in explaining judgment sums.  





Figure 1.  A comparison of judgment sums by judgment type and distribution. The error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
As can be seen, judgment sums for both probability and frequency are slightly greater 
for the even distribution compared to the uneven distribution, and overall probability 
judgments are higher than frequency judgments.  In order to test this hypothesis, the 
following models were run: 
Judgment ~ Judgment Type + Distribution + Judgment Type * Distribution 
Probability Judgment ~ Distribution 
Frequency Judgment ~ Distribution 
Although both patterns are consistent with prior work (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a, 
2003b; Sprenger et al., 2011; Sprenger & Dougherty, 2006) only the effect of 
judgment type was supported statistically (BF= 11957.43 ±11.52%). The test of the 




hypothesis (BF= 0.586 ±8.14%). Critically, the test of the interaction yielded modest 
support for the null hypothesis: Comparing the interaction model with the two-main 
effects model yielded a BF=0.179 ±8.14%, which suggests that the two-main effects 
model is over 5 times more likely than the interaction model. Moreover, comparison 
of the interaction model with the main effect model that includes only judgment type 
provided strong evidence in favor of the one-main effect model over the interaction 
model. Taken together, these results suggest that neither distribution nor the 
interaction between distribution and judgment type is useful in explaining judgment 
sums. Focusing on each judgment type, results were inconclusive on whether the type 
of distribution was an important predictor in the model for probability judgments (BF 
= 0.387 ±1.13%).  However, for frequency judgments, results showed that the data 
was much more likely to be observed from the alternative model than the null model 
(BF10 = 781.914 ±1.05%).   
Question 2 
What is the relation between each judgment type and memory ability?   
The hypotheses of interests here are about the expected relation between each 
memory ability and judgment sum as a function of judgment type.  I hypothesized 
that RA should have a negative relation to both probability and frequency judgments. 
For WM, the prediction was that probability judgments would have a negative 
relation and that there should be no relation with frequency judgments. Figure 2 
shows the relation between each judgment type and memory ability.  To test these 
relations, the following models were run: 




Frequency Judgment ~ Distribution + RA + WM 
 
Figure 2. The relation between retrieval and working memory ability with judgment sums. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval region. 
Probability Judgments. The plot shows that probability judgment sums are negatively 
correlated with retrieval ability (r= -0.257) suggesting that those who perform better 
on long-term memory retrieval tasks tend to have lower probability judgment sums. 
Results from the model comparison revealed support that retrieval ability predicted 
probability judgments (BF = 23.063 ±0.89%) and this held when controlling for 
individual differences in WM (BF= 35.058 ±4.89%).  This suggests that the data are 
more likely to be observed in models that include retrieval ability as a predictor when 
compared to models without it.   
 In regards to WM, unlike previous findings, working memory appears to have 




the model comparison revealed no support that a model containing WM improved 
data-model fit over the null model (BF = 0.329 ±3.15%).  This shifted to inconclusive 
evidence when controlling for all other predictors (distribution, RA, and participant) 
in the model (BF = 0.757 ±3.9%).   
 As mentioned before, each model was run with and without those who 
performed to criteria in complex span tasks, and each of these sets was run with and 
without potential outliers.  These analyses only changed the magnitude of the BFs.  
For example, when controlling for the other model predictors, the range of BFs for 
WM was 0.754 to 1.086.  For RA, the range of BFs was 20.501 to 49.752. Thus, the 
statistical conclusions from the main dataset are robust to the decision to include or 
exclude influential data points and the performance criteria of the WM span 
measures.  Subsequent hypotheses conclusions will report any changes that may yield 
a different interpretation of the data.   
Frequency Judgments.  Figure 2 shows a negative relation between frequency 
judgments and RA (r = -0.131), implying that those who perform better on long-term 
retrieval tasks tend to have lower frequency judgment sums. However, results from 
model comparison were inconclusive when looking at RA as a predictor of frequency 
judgments (BF = 0.797 ±3.22%), which held even when controlling for WM and 
distribution (BF = 1.225 ±6.47%).   
 In regards to WM, similar to probability judgments, the plot suggests a very 
weak to no relation between WM and frequency judgment sums (r = -0.032). Model 




frequency judgment sums (BF = 0.469 ±4.01%).  This was also the case when 
controlling for distribution and RA (BF = 0.611 ±6.4%).   
Exploratory Analysis 
 The purpose of the following exploratory factor analyses was to understand 
the covariation among the observed variables as a function of the assumed latent 
constructs (Hancock & Mueller, 2010).  Analysis conducted using Bayesian model 
comparison evaluated memory ability using composite scores.  These scores came 
from measures that were assumed to theoretically tap into their respective construct.  
The idea here is that the tasks used in this experiment are effect indicators of a latent 
ability.  Further, because a newly developed task was used, experience fluency, it is 
of interest to evaluate whether all measures loaded appropriately onto their latent 
factor.  Thus, two additional types of analysis were conducted, an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) and a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). 
 The purpose of the EFA is to assess the latent nature of the memory tasks and 
to provide additional insights into understanding the variation in judgments. The data 
were re-analyzed as follows: (1) the latent variables were extracted out of the 
different memory measures, (2) for each latent variable, a factor score was derived for 
each participant, and (3) probability and frequency judgment estimates were each 
regressed onto the factor scores.  This allows for possible insights on how individual 
differences in these factors influence and relate to probability and frequency 
judgments.  Finally, while an EFA starts with the data, the purpose of the CFA is to 




structure.  That is, the a-priori latent constructs will be assessed by checking if the 
observed measures load appropriately onto their respective memory construct. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Method  
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) was conducted on the 5 measured memory variables 
in order to extract latent variables.  Instead of using just one dependent variable per 
task, the outcomes of each block within each task was used.  Thus, across the 5 tasks, 
there were a total of 15 variables that went into the factor analysis.  The number of 
factors to be extracted will depend both on theory and interpretability. In this 
particular scenario, at minimum, it is expected that at least two factors should arise 
from the data (WM and RA). However, since the retrieval tasks were comprised of 
fluency and recall measures, a 3-factor solution would be justifiable.  To assist with 
interpretation, orthogonal rotation was used, specifically, the results below are based 
on varimax rotation. Finally, factor scores were then saved for each participant using 
the regression method. These scores were then used to predict the different types of 
judgments. The impetus and further justifications for the specific methods used for 
this EFA can be found in the appendix. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Results 
Rotated Factors Solution. Principal components analysis was first run on the data to 
aid in determining the number of factors one should extract. The scree plot and results 
from the Minimum Average Partial procedure (MAP) suggested that the number of 
factors to extract was 2 and 3, respectively.  In concert with theory, interpretability of 




solution. Additional output from the EFA, including scree plot, results from the MAP 
procedure, and variance explained of the 2 and 3-factor solution are included in the 
appendix. 
 Factor 1 had high loadings of the fluency tasks.  The high loadings of factor 2 
were with DFR and Symmetry Span.  The high loadings on factor 3 were Operation 
Span.  Below is a table of factor loadings.  Factor scores were derived then used as 
predictors in a model that looked at frequency judgments and a model that looked a 
probability judgment. Bayesian model comparison was used to evaluate the top model 
for each judgment type, in addition to each factor. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Category Fluency 1 .679 .368 .035 
Category Fluency 2 .765 .264 -.026 
Category Fluency 3 .673 .189 .095 
Experience Fluency 1 .758 -.084 .083 
Experience Fluency 2 .552 -.122 -.032 
Experience Fluency 3 .657 -.016 .173 
Delayed Free Recall 1 .170 .452 .199 
Delayed Free Recall 2 .047 .690 .129 
Delayed Free Recall 3 .137 .692 .069 
Symmetry Span 3 .028 .460 .342 
Symmetry Span 4 -.047 .493 .298 
Symmetry Span 5 -.086 .457 .393 




Operation Span 5 .094 .161 .690 
Operation Span 6 .128 .210 .673 
Table 1. Rotated Factor Matrix using Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax rotation 
 
Figure 3. Judgment Sums and Memory Factors from the EFA on experiment 1 data. The grey area represents the 
95% confidence interval region. 
Predicting Judgments.  Figure 3 shows the relation between each judgment type and 
memory factor.  Recall that analysis from model comparisons revealed that RA was 
an important predictor of probability judgment sums and that for frequency 
judgments, both WM and RA drew inconclusive evidence. The plots in figure 3 
suggest that for probability judgments, factor 1, which contained high loading from 
the fluency tasks, has the strongest relation with judgment sums out of the 3 factors.  
The remaining factors show either little to no relation with probability judgment 




factor 2, which contains high loadings of symmetry span and DFR, having the 
strongest relation relative to the other factors.  To test these relations, the following 
models were run:  
Probability Judgment ~ Distribution + Factor 1 + Factor 2 + Factor 3 
Frequency Judgment ~ Distribution + Factor 1 + Factor 2 + Factor 3 
 
Probability Judgments.  For probability judgments, the top model was a single factor 
model, Factor 1 (BF = 47.736 ±2.37%).  This model was still preferred over the 
second best fitting model, a 2 factor model with factors 1 and 3 (BF = 3.107 ±3.8%).  
This suggests that the factor with high loadings from both fluency tasks best predicted 
the variance in probability judgment sums.  When controlling for each other predictor 
in the model (factor 2, factor 3, distribution, and participant), there was strong support 
for factor 1 (r = -0.287, BF = 27.463 ±6.07%).  Results were inconclusive for factor 2 
(r = 0.009, BF = 0.399 ±11.96%) and factor 3 (r = 0.010, BF = 0.444 ±8.06%).  
Finally, there was no support that distribution should be included in the model (r = -
0.033, BF = 0.320 ±4.4%).  
Frequency Judgments. The top model for frequency judgments was a 2-factor model 
which had distribution and factor 2 as predictors (BF = 6549.973 ±26.57%).  
However, when compared to the second best fitting model, a 3-factor model which 
added factor 1, results were inconclusive as to which had better predictive fit (BF = 
1.989 ±26.82%).  Looking at the effect of distribution, with all other predictors 
controlled for, results showed strong support (r = -0.085, BF = 6079.628 ±23.16%).  
When examining each factor on its own, controlling for all other predictors in the 




0.053), the BF for factor 2 was 2.060 ±22.97% (r = -0.149), and the BF for factor 3 
was 0.982 ±22.86% (r = 0.031).  In line with the findings thus far, this suggests that 
the best predictor, relative to all others in the model, is distribution.   
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Method 
An interesting finding from the EFA results was the split between the working 
memory tasks between factors 2 and 3 and the retrieval tasks between factors 1 and 2.  
As mentioned previously, one way of assessing the assumptions of the measures and 
their respective latent constructs is to conduct a CFA.  CFAs can be thought of as a 
special case of EFA, in which CFAs impose more restrictions on a measurement 
model, with these restrictions usually being based on a-priori theoretical assumptions.   
 The indicator variables used in the following CFA were the same as what was 
used in the EFA.  Additionally, the error variances of indicator variables were 
allowed to co-vary if they were within the same task and if the task structure was 
highly similar.  Latent factors were also allowed to co-vary.  Finally, the Satorra-
Bentler Scaling method was used to adjust for non-normality (Satorra & Bentler, 
2010). Two measurement models were tested, a 2-factor memory model and a 3-
factor memory model.  For the 2-factor memory model, the latent variables were WM 
and RA, similar to how the composites were formed in the prior model comparisons. 
The 3-factor memory model was similar to the 2-factor model, with the exception that 
RA was parsed into semantic memory and episodic memory.  This was guided by the 
scatterplots of retrieval ability at the task level and the grouping of the factors from 




Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results 
 
 
Figure 4. Standardized results from the CFA conducted on the 2-factor memory model (panel A) and the 3-factor 
memory model (panel B).  
 
RMSEA with 95% 
CI CFI SRMR BIC 
Model A - 2 Factor  
0.072 
(0.049,0.094) 0.914 0.103 9947.518 
Model B – 3 Factor  
0.048          
(0.01, 0.074) 0.962 0.059 9915.205 
Table 2.  Model fit indices of the 2 and 3-factor memory models.  
Task reliabilities are reported in the appendix.  Figure 4 shows the 2 memory 






model fit indices from the CFA. Using the measurement fit guideless proposed by Hu 
& Bentler (Hu & Bentler, 1995), only the 3-factor model, had good fit when 
compared to the 2-factor model.  Additionally, because the 2-factor model is nested 
within the 3-factor model, a chi-square difference test can be used to determine 
whether the addition of more parameters was worth the increase in overall data-model 
fit.  Results revealed that the loss of degrees of freedom was worth the increase in fit, 
χ2(22) = 67.1941, p= 6.474471e−07.  Additionally, the BIC values were compared 
and results also revealed strong evidence for the 3 factor model over the 2-factor 
model (BF = 10391513).  Construct quality indices of the latent factors for each 
model are reported in the appendix.   
Experiment 1 Discussion 
Model comparison results suggest that overall, the type of judgment (probability of 
frequency) was meaningful in predicting the variance in judgment sums and that the 
frequency of which an item is presented has predictive value to the estimate of the 
particular item.  For probability judgments, the best overall model was either a one or 
2-factor model which included RA and WM as predictors.  In regards to memory 
abilities, there was support that retrieval ability plays a role in accounting for the 
variance in probability judgments. For frequency judgments, the top models 
decisively included distribution.   
            Additionally, exploratory factor analysis suggests that different aspect of 
retrieval ability may differentially relate to each judgment type.  Specifically, the 




constructs (semantic memory and episodic memory, respectively) and that these 
constructs may relate differently to the different types of judgments.   
Chapter 5: Experiment 2 
The purpose of experiment 2 was to follow up on the findings in experiment 1.  First, 
we wanted to test the replicability of experiment 1 results.  Further, because we are 
interested in individual differences in latent abilities, more measures were included in 
experiment 2 in order to have more refined latent constructs and analyses.  In 
experiment 1, retrieval from long-term memory was measured as one general latent 
ability (retrieval ability) and Bayesian model comparison revealed the data are more 
likely to be observed under models that included retrieval ability as a predictor when 
compared to models without it.  However, this assumes that retrieval from long-term 
memory has the same relation or nature with each judgment type across the types of 
long-term memory being accessed.  The exploratory analysis conducted in 
experiment 1 seems to suggest that this may not be the case.  That is, retrieval from 
long-term memory and different judgment types may vary depending on the nature of 
the type of retrieval.   
 To better assess this, experiment 2, adds more measures such that retrieval 
from long-term memory was split into retrieval from memory that was more semantic 
in nature (semantic fluency or semantic memory), and retrieval from memory that 
was more episodic in nature (episodic memory).  The parsing of long-term memory 
retrieval into semantic and episodic memory was guided by the findings from both 




 Hypothesis testing in experiment 1 was conducted by using composite 
variables to represent unobserved latent abilities.  However, the use of composite 
variables often carry measurement error and can attenuate the relation between it and 
the outcome of interest.  The inclusion of more indicator (measured) variables in 
experiment 2 is to take a more intentional latent modeling approach.  Analysis of the 
central core hypotheses will still be assessed using Bayesian model comparison to 
evaluate the strength of evidence for each memory ability.  To provide converging 
evidence, additional analysis using a latent variables approach will be conducted by 
use of structural equation modeling (SEM).  An advantage of using a latent variables 
approach is that it allows for the handling and accounting of measurement error that 
may attenuate relations between the latent variables of interest and a particular 
outcome variable.      
 Finally, the testing of the central questions and hypotheses in experiment 2 are 
conducted in a similar fashion to those in experiment 1.  However, instead of 
modeling judgments as a function of a 2-factor memory model (WM and RA), 
judgments were modeled using a 3-factor memory model, WM, semantic memory 
(SM), and episodic memory (EM). Because we are interested in the unique 
contribution of each latent memory ability, a higher sample size to gain additional 
power together with more indicator variables also allows us to assess the memory 
measurement model to assure that the measures load onto their respective latent 
abilities appropriately.  Altogether, experiment 2 will provide more insights into how 
memory, and the way it is measured, relate to judgments as a function of judgment 





The methods used in experiment 2 were generally the same as the methods outlined in 
experiment 1, with the exception that participants completed more memory tasks, 
which will be described below in the Measures section.  Any other differences in the 
experiment design or analysis will be mentioned in the relevant section.  
Measures 
All of the measures that were included in experiment 1 were included in experiment 
2.  Thus, only new tasks or task changes will be discussed in this section. Tasks were 
programmed with PsychoPy’s version 1.82.01 or E-Prime 2.0 build 2.0.10.353.    
Assessing Working Memory 
Reading Span. Similar to operation and symmetry span used in study 1, the shortened 
version of the reading span was included in experiment 2.  For this task, participants 
were asked to make true false judgments of sentences on the screen between the 
presentations of the letters.  Similar to the other complex span tasks, the number of 
alternating sentence comprehension problems and letters varied per block, and after a 
certain number of alternating sentences and letters were presented, a recall screen 
appeared and participants were asked to select the letters that were presented in the 
correct order.   
Assessing Semantic Memory 
The assessment of semantic memory was done by using the category and experience 
fluency tasks, which were described in experiment 1.  An additional fluency task was 




Letter Fluency.  The letter fluency task is similar to the category fluency task in that 
participants are given 2 minutes to generate as many words as they can that begin 
with a specified letter. Again, the order of the experimental letters was randomized 
for each participant. The letters used in the task were standard from the literature (A, 
S, F). The practice letter was L. 
Assessing Episodic Memory 
Episodic memory was measured by using the delayed-free recall task from 
experiment 1 and the three additional measures.  Each episodic memory task included 
a learning phase and then a recall phase which are described below.   
Cued Recall.  The cued recall task requires participants to go through a learning phase 
and then a retrieval phase.  During the learning phase, participants are presented with 
40 word pairs, each for 6 seconds. After the learning phase, participants go into a self-
paced retrieval phase where they were cued by with the first word of a word pair and 
then asked to retrieve the second word of the word pair.  An individual’s score was 
the total number of words correctly recalled.  
Picture-Source Recognition.  Participants were informed that they would be presented 
with images, each appearing on one of four locations on the screen, and to try to 
correctly recall the location of which the image appeared.  During the learning phase, 
each image was presented for 1 second in one of the four locations on the screen.  
After the learning phase, participants moved onto the retrieval phase in which 30 old 
and 30 new pictures were presented.  While these images were presented, participants 
had to respond with which of the four locations the image appeared in or whether the 




in order to differentiate between source accuracy and correct rejection.  In previous 
studies, the score on this task has simply been the proportion of correct responses. 
The two scores were the proportion of old items that were correctly identified in the 
correct quadrant and the proportion of new items correctly identified as new.  
Gender-Source Recognition.  In this task, participants were told that they would hear 
30 words, read in either in a male or female voice and to try to remember the word 
and the gender of the voice.  During the retrieval phase, 30 old and 30 new words 
were presented on the computer screen and participants were given 5 seconds to 
respond with whether the word was new or old, and if old, whether the gender of the 
voice that the word was read in was a male or female voice.  Similar to Picture-
Source Recognition, participants had two scores, source accuracy and correct 
rejection.  The two scores were the proportion of old items that were correctly 
identified with the correct gender and the proportion of new items correctly identified 
as new. 
Analysis  
Coding of Variables and Composites 
Memory Abilities.  Composites were formed in a similar manner to experiment 1 in 
that for each construct, the outcome variable for each task was then z-scored and 
averaged to form each memory ability composite.   
Outliers and Robustness Analysis 
Outliers and tasks with a performance threshold were also handled in a similar 




included all data points, one that included only those who met performance criteria on 
all complex span tasks, one with potential outliers removed, and one with potential 
outliers removed and contained only those who met performance criteria on all 
complex span tasks. Again, for each dataset, composites were re-calculated such that 
the composite score only carried information of those who were included in the 
analysis.  
Results 
Final Analysis Sample and Demographics 
Two-hundred and forty (mean age = 19.06 ± 1.49, 161 females) University of 
Maryland undergraduates completed the study.  Out of the 240 participants who 
completed the study, 10 participants had missing data on one or more of the tasks.  Of 
those 10 participants, 3 did not complete the judgment task and 4 did not complete 
any of the memory measures correctly.  Those 7 participants were excluded from the 
final analysis dataset.  The remaining 3 participants, and in general, all participants, 
were included in any analysis contained variables that they had data for.  Thus, the 
final main analysis will include 233 participants (156 females, mean age = 19.05 ± 
1.50).  The total number of participants for the dataset containing only those who met 
performance criteria on working memory measures was 188.  The number of 
participants in the dataset with potential outliers removed was 197, and the number of 
participants in the dataset with potential outliers removed and who also met 





A correlation matrix of the memory composites, task variables, and judgment sums 
are provided in the appendix.  
Question 1 
Is there evidence of the comparison process for probability judgments and lack of one 
for frequency judgments?   
The hypothesis was that the overall magnitude of probability judgment sums for 
evenly distributed items would be greater when compared to the magnitude of 
unevenly distributed.  Further, no meaningful difference was expected for frequency 
judgment sums as a function of distribution.   
 





Figure 5 shows judgment sums as a function of judgment type and distribution.  
Somewhat similar to experiment 1, the overall judgment sums for items that were 
evenly distributed are greater when compared to those from the uneven distribution.  
In experiment 1, results revealed that judgment magnitude as a function of 
distribution was inconclusive for probability judgments but decisive for frequency 
judgments.  The same models were used to test this prediction for experiment 2:  
Judgment ~ Judgment Type + Distribution + Judgment Type * Distribution 
Probability Judgment ~ Distribution  
Frequency Judgment ~ Distribution  
Similar to experiment 1, there was decisive support of the effect of judgment type, 
when controlling for all other terms in the model (r = 0.147, BF = 123643.7 ±6.73%).  
Additionally, the test of the interaction model with the two-main effects model 
revealed that the data are over 8 times more likely (BF = 0.121 ±3.36%) to be 
observed under the 2 main-effect model over the interaction model. Finally, in 
contrast to experiment 1, there was support that for distribution as a predictor in 
modeling the judgment sums (r = -0.103, BF = 106.689 ±3.32%).   
 Focusing now on each judgment type, for frequency judgments, similar to the 
findings in experiment 1, results also showed strong support for the effect of 
distribution (BF = 19978233 ±0.76%).   For probability judgments, there was also 
strong support for the effect of distribution on probability judgment sums (BF = 
10542807 ±0.66%).  Particularly, that the sums from the evenly distributed items 
were greater than those in the unevenly distributed items.  Overall, experiment 2 





What is the relation between each judgment type and memory ability?   
The findings from experiment 1 suggest that those who perform better on long-term 
memory retrieval measures have lower judgment sums when compared to those who 
do not perform as well.  Further, exploratory analyses suggest that semantic fluency 
measures may be the driving force behind this finding. For the current experiment, 
retrieval ability was parsed into semantic memory (SM) and episodic memory (EM).  
The prediction is that RA would still be important to modeling probability judgment, 
but that SM would have the strongest support among the retrieval abilities.  Figure 6 
shows the relation between probability judgment sums and each memory ability.   
 
Figure 6. The relation between memory ability and judgment sums as a function of judgment type. The grey area 





The scatterplot reveals, there’s a negative correlation between each memory ability 
and probability judgment sums.  The strongest correlation is between probability 
judgment sums and semantic ability (r = -0.102), followed by episodic memory (r = -
0.079), and then working memory (r = -0.038).  For frequency judgments, the 
strongest correlation was with retrieval from episodic memory (r = -0.034), followed 
by working memory (r = -0.013), and then by semantic memory (r = -0.006).  
However, the correlations among all judgment types and abilities were generally 
weak.  To test the relations of each memory ability and judgment sums, the following 
models were evaluated:  
Probability Judgment ~ Distribution +SM + EM + WM 
Frequency Judgment ~ Distribution +SM + EM + WM 
Similar to experiment 1, results were inconclusive for WM as a predictor in both 
probability (BF = 0.554 ±7.25%) and frequency judgments (BF = 0.599 ±7.77%).  
Further, results revealed inconclusive evidence of either SM or EM being predictive 
of probability judgments (BF = 0.923 ±7.35% and BF = 0.562 ±7.26%, respectively).  
This was also the case for frequency judgments (SM: BF = 0.562 ±7.72%, EM: BF = 
0.558 ±7.55%), which was similar to the findings from experiment 1.  Taken together, 
while there was support for retrieval ability as a predictor for modeling probability 
judgment sums in experiment 1, results from experiment 2 reveal inconclusive 
evidence on retrieval from semantic and episodic memory.    
Latent Variables Approach and Modeling Judgments 
Again, an impetus of experiment 2 is the use of a more intentional and refined latent 




judgments by use of factors or latent variables is that it allows for a cleaner test of the 
relation between the latent factors of interest and an outcome by accounting for 
measurement error.  The results provided through Bayesian model comparison used 
composites to represent the unobserved memory abilities (WM, SM, and EM).  
Because composites do not account for task measurement error, the relation between 
composites and an outcome of interest may often be attenuated.  The general 
philosophy taken in experiment 2 is to first, assess the memory measurement model.  
This is similar to the CFA conducted in experiment 1 where the 2 and 3-factor 
memory models were evaluated.  Then, path analysis using a two-step structural 
equation modeling (SEM) procedure will be conducted on the appropriate 
measurement model to predict the different types of judgments. Altogether, this 
approach will allow us to provide converging evidence for the Bayesian model 
comparison results and assess how we are measuring what we hope to measure.  
More details on each of these methods will be outlined below.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Method 
The goal of the CFA in experiment 2 is to ensure that the measures appropriately load 
onto their respective latent memory ability.  Because we are interested in 
understanding how constraints in different aspects of memory uniquely contribute to 
judgments, it is important to also take into account the collinearity among the latent 
abilities.  Further, while several models of memory have been proposed and 
researched, the theory behind why short and long-term memory tasks covary may 
differ depending on the memory model adopted.  By using theory to guide different 




one another, one can gain insights into the more true relation between these memory 
abilities and how they impact certain outcomes of interest. 
 In the following analysis, four models of memory were assessed.  The first is a 
2-factor memory model. This is similar to how experiment 1 measured WM and RA, 
but in experiment 2, more tasks were added.  The next model is a 3-factor memory 
model.  This memory model parses RA into SM and EM.  This was how composites 
were formed for Bayesian model comparison.  Two additional memory models, a bi-
factor and 2nd order model, were also evaluated.  The bi-factor (residual) model is one 
in which there is a general retrieval ability that drives performance across all memory 
tasks, and then 3 other latent memory abilities that are unique to specific groupings of 
tasks (WM, SM, and EM).  Finally, the 2nd order model is a model where SM, EM, 
and WM all depend on or is caused by a general latent retrieval ability that underlies 
the performance across all the memory tasks. In contrast to the bi-factor model, there 
is a direct causal path between RA and SM, EM, and WM.   
 The indicator variables used in the following CFA are individual performance 
or outcome scores on each task and additionally, were the variables used to compute 
the memory composites in the Bayesian model comparisons.  CFA analysis followed 
a similar approach to experiment 1, in that error variances of indicator variables were 
allowed to co-vary and latent factors were also allowed to co-vary.  Finally, again, the 
Satorra-Bentler Scaling method was used to adjust for non-normality (Satorra & 



















Figure 7. Standardized results from the CFA conducted on the 2-factor memory model (panel A), the 3-factor 




95% CI CFI SRMR BIC 
Model A: 2 Factor 
0.067         
(0.04, 0.086) 0.921 0.146 11049.102 
Model B: 3 Factor 
0.032         
(0.00, 0.057) 0.982 0.043 11009.057 
Model C: Bi-factor 
0.000         
(0.00, 0.032) 1.000 0.027 11003.060 
Model D: 2nd Order 
0.043         
(0.015, 0.065) 0.967 0.068 11019.718 
Table 3.  Model fit indices of the four memory models from CFAs on experiment 2 data. Indices that meet the fit 
guidelines are bolded, with the exception of BIC. 
 
Task reliabilities and construct quality indices are reported in the appendix.  Figure 7 
shows the standardized loadings of the 4 measurement models.  All paths that are 
shown in this figure are significant.  Table 3 shows model fit indices from the CFA. 
Again, using the measurement fit guideless proposed by Hu & Bentler (Hu & Bentler, 
1995), the 3 factor, bi-factor3, and 2nd order memory models met the criteria for good 
data-model fit across the four memory models tested.    
 First, focusing between the 2 and 3-factor memory model, because the 2-
factor model is nested within the 3-factor model, a chi-square difference test can be 
used to determine whether the addition of more parameters was worth the increase in 
overall data-model fit.  Results revealed that the loss of degrees of freedom was worth 
the increase in fit, χ2(1) = 27.66901, p= 7.44157e-08.  Further, the 2nd order model is 
also nested within the bi-factor model (Yung, Thissen, & McLeod, 1999). Results 
                                                 
3 Note that the fit indices for RMSEA and CFI on the bi-factor model should not be strictly interpreted 




revealed that the loss of degrees of freedoms was worth the increase in fit, χ2(12) = 
37.45156, p= 0.00007.   
  Additionally, the BIC values were compared and BFs were computed to 
compare all four models.  Results revealed strong evidence that the data are more 
likely to be observed under the 3-factor model over the 2-factor model (BF = 
496205146).  Between the bi-factor model the 2nd order model, the bi-factor model 
had strong support (BF = 4142.273).  Finally, the bi-factor memory model was also 
preferred over the 3-factor model (BF = 20.05543).  Taken together, of the four 
memory models, the bi-factor model appears to be the most appropriate measurement 
model.   
Structural Equation Modeling Method 
The purpose of using SEM is to evaluate the structural paths between each judgment 
type and memory ability. The central hypotheses and predictions still remain the 
same.  Simply put, the prediction is that each judgment type will have a different 
relation between each memory ability.  Further, with the assumption that frequency 
and probability judgments engage different cognitive processes, the expectation is 
that the relations between each judgment type and memory ability will differ as a 
function of the judgment type.  Results from the CFA revealed that the 3-factor, bi-
factor, and 2nd order memory models met measurement fit guidelines.  Thus, path 
analysis will continue with these models.  With these models, the interest will be to 
evaluate the direct causal paths between probability judgments and each memory 




 A 2-step SEM procedure will be used where the measurement model is first 
assessed, and then the structure of the latent model is evaluated.  The purpose of the 
two-step SEM process is to isolate the data-model fit associated with the latent 
structure from that associated with the measurement portion of the model.  The first 
step is one where all factors and/or standalone variables that are not intended to be 
indicator variables are allowed to co-vary.  This is often referred to as the 
measurement phase.  Note that the models tested during this measurement phase are 
different from the philosophy of the CFAs conducted on the measurement models.  
This is because those purpose of the CFAs was to assess only the latent structure of 
memory.  Thus, these models did not include the outcome variables (judgment sums).  
The second step of the 2-step SEM procedure is one where a-priori paths are imposed 
onto the final measurement model that resulted from the measurement phase.  This is 
often referred to as the structural phase.  The data-model fit after the theoretical 
structure is imposed can then be compared to the data-model fit of the final 
measurement model.   
Structural Equation Modeling Results 
 
RMSEA with 
95% CI CFI SRMR BIC 
Model B: 3 Factor 
0.037 
(0.024, 0.049) 0.967 0.036 35150.699 
Model C: Bi-factor 
0.049 
(0.037,0.060) 0.947 0.047 35189.747 
Model D: 2nd Order 
0.043 
(0.031, 0.054) 0.951 0.050 35162.279 
Table 4.  SEM fit indices of the final structural models from experiment 2.  
Table 4 provides the fit indices of the final measurement models resulting from the 




structural phase were the same, the fit indices remained the same.  As can be seen, all 
three models that met satisfactory fit from the CFA also met satisfactory fit criteria 
from the final structural portion.   The model with the lowest BIC was the 3-factor 
model.  This also seemed to be the case when comparing the model fit indices across 
the three models.  Again, the BIC values were compared and BFs were computed to 
compare all 3 models.  Results revealed evidence that the data are more likely to be 
observed under the 3-factor model over the bi-factor model (BF = 301415419) and 
the 2nd order model (BF = 327.013).  Between the bi-factor and 2nd order model, 
results showed evidence that data are more likely to be observed under the 2nd order 




































Memory Model Path Estimate P-Value 
3 Factor 
Probability Judgments ON   
SM -0.026 0.635 
EM -0.013 0.811 
WM 0.027 0.638 
Frequency Judgments  ON   
SM -0.118 0.082 
EM -0.008 0.882 
WM 0.022 0.947 
Bi-factor 
Probability Judgments ON   
SM -0.051 0.018 
EM 0.140 0.058 
WM -0.207 0.001 
RA 0.048 0.457 
Frequency Judgments  ON   
SM -0.019 0.305 
EM -0.064 0.549 
WM -0.009 0.746 
 RA 0.019 0.895 
2nd Order 
Probability Judgments ON   
RA -0.120 0.019 
Frequency Judgments  ON   
RA -0.035 0.488 
Table 5.  Direct effect estimates for the 3 factor, bi-factor, and 2nd order models from experiment 2 data.  
 
Figure 8 shows the results of path analysis conducted on the 3 models.  Table 5 
provides the direct effect estimates along with their associated p-value between two 
judgment types and latent memory abilities, or the paths of interest.  For the 3 factor 
model, none of the paths between the latent memory abilities and judgments were 
significant. This provides converging evidence with the Bayesian model comparison 
results from experiment 2 data.  When examining the direct effect estimates in the bi-
factor model, the significant paths were ones between SM and probability judgments 
and RA and probability judgments.  Finally, in the 2nd order model, the significant 




Experiment 2 Discussion 
In experiment 2, Bayesian model comparison results revealed evidence for the main 
effect of distribution and judgment type.  For both probability and frequency 
judgments, results only supported distribution to be included in modeling both types 
of judgments.  Further, results were inconclusive for each memory ability in 
predictive both probability and frequency judgments.  Further, CFA revealed that out 
of the four memory models assessed, 3 models met satisfactory fit, the 3-factor 
model, bi-factor model, and 2nd order model.  Path analysis conducted on these 
models using a 2-step SEM procedure revealed interesting results.  On the 3 factor 
model, none of the paths between the latent memory abilities and each judgment type 
were significant.  For the bi-factor model, SM and RA were predictive of probability 
judgments. Finally, for the 2nd order model, general RA was significant in predicting 
probability judgments.  Taken together, this suggests that how memory is modeled 
and measured may influence which memory abilities appear to meaningful in 
predicting judgment sums.   
Chapter 6: Combined Data 
 Results from experiment 2 reveal that how memory is modeled and measured 
may influence which latent abilities come out as important to modeling judgments.  
The purpose of combined data analysis is to gain additional power.  Additionally, the 
central questions of interest were re-analyzed using both the 2 and 3-factor memory 




experiment 1 and 2 Bayesian model comparison findings and will also be the source 
of the overall project’s general conclusions.  
 As mentioned previously, model comparison or selection typically tells one 
which model best fits the data relative to the other models of which it is compared.  
Further, in the philosophy that a model’s utility lies in its predictive ability, cross-
validation on an overall model, and each judgment type will be performed.  The 
thinking is that it a model has high predictive quality, then the new data predicted 
from the model fitted with the observed data and thus, both predicted and observed 
data for within and out of sample should be similar to one another.  This can be 
conceptualized as the model’s ability to predict unobserved data.  Finally, the 
magnitude of BFs from hypotheses testing for each predictor should not be conflated 
with an independent variables effect estimate.  Since cross-validation will be 
performed, parameter estimates for each predictor of interest will be estimated and 
reported.   
Analysis 
Coding of Variables and Constructs 
The variables that were the same in both experiment 1 and 2 were included in the 
combined analysis.  The data set used in the analysis reported below contained raw 
scores from each experiment.  Once the data were combined across both experiments, 
z-scores and composites were re-calculated using the means and standard deviations 
from the combined sample.  The same method of forming composites used in 




handling of missing data points, outliers, and the re-calculation of z-scores and 
composites on data that did not contain those who fell below threshold performance 
on the complex span tasks. 
Further, similar to experiment 2, a 3-factor memory model was used to examine the 
impact of individual differences in memory on judgment sums using Bayesian model 
comparison. For the combined dataset, the memory abilities are represented by 
composites constrained by measures that were included in both experiments.  Thus, 
WM was measured by operation and symmetry span, SM was measured by category 
and experience fluency, and EM was measured by DFR.  Finally, all model 
comparisons controlled for the random effect of participant and experiment.  
Results 
Final Analysis Sample and Demographics 
All participants who were included in analyses from experiment 1 and experiment 2 
were included in the combined analysis. Thus, the final sample size of the combined 
dataset included three-hundred and seventy-five participants (262 females, mean age 
= 19.10 ± 2.03).  The total number of participants for the dataset containing only 
those who met performance criteria on working memory measures was 311.  The 
number of participants in the dataset with potential outliers removed was 335, and the 
number of participants in the dataset with potential outliers removed and who also 





A correlation matrix of the judgments, composite memory abilities, and task variables 
are located in the appendix.    
Question 1 
Is there evidence of the comparison process for probability judgments and lack of one 
for frequency judgments?   
Again, the prediction for this question is that the overall magnitude of probability 
judgment sums for evenly distributed items would be greater when compared to the 
magnitude of unevenly distributed.  This is not expected for frequency judgment 
sums as a function of distribution.   
 





Figure 9 shows judgment sums as a function of judgment type and distribution and 
again, the figure shows that the overall judgment sums for items that were evenly 
distributed are greater when compared to those from the uneven distribution.  The 
difference between findings from experiment 1 and 2 was that experiment 1 had 
inconclusive evidence of distribution as a main effect and for probability judgments, 
while experiment 2 found support for distribution in both models.  Analysis on the 
combined dataset revealed strong support for judgment type (r = 0.149, 9598575966 
±2.06%) and distribution (r = -0.084, 350.252 ±2.15%).   Additionally, the test of the 
interaction model with the two-main effects model revealed that the data are over 8 
times more likely to be observed under the 2 main-effect model over the interaction 
model (BF = 0.127 ±2.24%).  Finally, there was decisive support for the effect of 
distribution for frequency (BF = 216253820269 ±7.74%) and probability (BF = 
945919.6 ±7.32%) judgments sums.  
Question 2 
What is the relation between each judgment type and memory ability?   
The findings from experiment 1 suggest that those who perform better on long-term 
memory retrieval measures had less subadditive judgments when compared to those 
who did not perform as well.  Further, exploratory analysis suggests that semantic 
fluency measures may be the driving force behind this finding. For the current 
experiment, retrieval ability was parsed into semantic memory (SM) and episodic 
memory (EM).  The prediction is that RA would still be important to modeling 




retrieval abilities.  Figure 10 shows the relation between probability judgment sums 
and each memory ability.   
 
Figure 10. The relation between memory ability and judgment sums as a function of judgment type. The grey area 
represents the 95% confidence interval region. 
 




Probability    
Experiment 1 0.37±4.42% 0.70 ±4.79% 27.78 ±5.85 
Experiment 2 18747146 ±6.59% 0.52 ±4.94% 1.032±6.5% 
Combined 531340.8 ±7.94% 0.32 ±7.92% 18.65±8.8% 
Frequency    
Experiment 1 10093.86 ±6.12% 0.68 ±5.14% 1.19 ±6.22% 
Experiment 2 11751359 ±7.24% 0.51 ±7.07% 0.43 ±6.87% 
Combined 628897393188 ±9.88% 0.54 ±9.29% 0.69 ±9.21% 
Table 6. BFs for Memory abilities predicting each judgment sum type across each set of analyses. BFs for 


















Probability     
Experiment 1 0.42 ±3.86% 0.53 ±6.22% 38.74 ±6.06% 0.48 ±4.22% 
Experiment 2 17972097 ±8.41% 0.63 ±8.07% 0.94 ±8.09% 0.58 ±8.07% 
Combined 863037.2 ±8.35% 0.46 ±8.08% 21.67 ±8.97% 0.49 ±8.1% 
Frequency     
Experiment 1 9325.93 ±20.15% 0.94 ±21.32% 0.56 ±21.75% 18.80 ±20.4% 
Experiment 2 5508386 ±9.85% 0.57±8.95% 0.53 ±8.96% 0.56 ±8.93% 
Combined 640948315656 ±9.85% 0.50 ±9.21% 0.56 ±9.28% 2.44 ±9.56% 
Table 7. BFs for Memory abilities predicting each judgment sum type across each set of analyses. BFs for 
retrieval ability was assessed using a 3-factor memory model.    
 The scatterplot reveals negative correlations between each memory ability and 
judgment sum, regardless of judgment type.  When focusing on a 2-factor memory 
model, the strongest correlation to both types of judgments was RA (frequency 
judgments: r = -0.057; probability judgments: r = -0.165).  For WM, the correlation 
was r = -0.046 for probability judgments and r = -0.024 for frequency judgments.  For 
the 3 factor model, probability judgments have the strongest correlation was with 
semantic memory (r = -0.177), followed by episodic memory (r = -0.073), and lastly, 
working memory (r = -0.045).  For frequency judgments, the strongest correlation 
was with retrieval from episodic memory (r = -0.102), followed by working memory 
(r = -0.022), and then finally, semantic memory (r = -0.017).   
 Table 6 and 7 show the BFs of each memory ability on modeling each 
judgment type by the data source.  Table 5 uses a 2-factor memory model and table 6 
uses a 3-factor memory model.  It is worth noting that the memory composites used in 
these models are constrained to the 5 tasks that were included across both 




span, and symmetry span).  When considering the 2 factor model on the combined 
data, there is strong support for the inclusion of distribution when modeling judgment 
sums.  This was also the case for RA in modeling probability judgments.   
 Considering the 3-factor memory model, again, there is strong support for the 
inclusion of distribution in modeling judgment sums.  Further, individual differences 
in semantic memory had support for being included in the model predicting 
probability judgment sums. For frequency judgments, results were generally 
inconclusive for each memory ability across each set of analysis.   
Assessing Judgment Model Utility 
Overall: 
Judgment ~ Judgment Type * Distribution + WM + SM + EM 
By Judgment Type: 
Probability Judgment ~ Distribution + WM + SM + EM 
Frequency Judgment ~ Distribution + WM + SM + EM 
 
 Bayesian parameter estimation and cross-validation will be assessed for each 
of the models above.   
Cross-Validation and Parameter Estimation Methods 
Modeling Judgments.  Theoretically, the outcome variable, judgment sums, is a 
function of each individuals starting point (intercept), the overall main effect of the 
condition, and overall error.  The design of the study is hierarchical where level 1 




distributed items) and level 2 is at the level of participant, where intercepts are 
allowed to vary as a function of an individual’s latent memory ability.  
 
Figure 11.  Graphical representations of the cognitive models for overall judgments (A) and for each judgment 
type (B). 
The graphical models in figure 11, along with the overall and level 1 and 2 equations 
shows what each parameter is a function of.  The top panel shows the cognitive model 




predicting each judgment type (probability and frequency).  Parameters in double 
circles are deterministic.  For example, the delta of the condition is determined by the 
effect of condition, which is the difference between the two judgment sums means of 
each distribution. The delta of the intercept is determined by the overall intercept, the 
beta estimate of retrieval ability, the beta estimate of working memory, and the error 
of each participant.  For the overall model, there will be two additional level 1 terms, 
judgment type (B20) and the interaction between judgment type and distribution (B30).   
Specification of Priors and Likelihoods.  For all parameters that were estimated, 
weakly informative priors were used.  All betas were a function of a wide uniform 
distribution.  The level 2 error (the effect of participant), the assumption is that each 
individuals effect came from the same normal distribution with a mean of 0 with 
some unknown precision.  The precision at level 1 and level 2 are independent of 
each other, but at each level, are drawn from the same uniform distribution truncated 
at 0.  The specific values of each distribution are presented below.  
Parameter Prior Specification 
Fixed effects/ Betas parameters 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 ~𝑈𝑈(−1000,1000) 
Random Effect parameters 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖2), where  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖2  = 1/𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 
Variance parameters 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗2, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
2
 ~ 𝑈𝑈(0,1𝑏𝑏 + 7 ) 
Table 8. Table of priors placed on model parameters to be estimated. 
 
Sampling Procedure.  Sampling was performed within R version 3.5.0 and the 
models were written in JAGs version 4.3.0.  The number of chains was set to 5 at 
50,000 iterations each.  The number of adaptations and burn-ins was set to 10,000.  
All initial convergence assessment procedures include the visual assessments of trace, 
density, running means, autocorrelation, and potential scale reduction factor plots.  




parameters showed high autocorrelation so another model was initiated with thinning 
of 5 at 50,000 iterations for a total of 10,000 chains.  However, the autocorrelation 
and all estimates were still similar.  Because Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) 
was used to get estimates of effects and perform cross-validation, typical convergence 
and model diagnostics were assessed using standard practices (ex: trace plots, running 
means plots, posterior scale reduction factor, etc.).  These evaluations are provided in 
the appendix.  Additional plots or supplements can be provided upon request.   
Cross-Validation Procedure. Each model was fitted with 2/3rd of the sample.  
Selection of the sample was randomized for each model.  The parameter estimates 
were obtained and were used to predict within sample (the sample that the estimates 
were fitted to) and out of sample (the remaining 1/3rd of the sample).  The parameter 




Cross-Validation and Parameter Estimation Results 
 
Figure 12.  The distribution of the observed and predicted values from the overall, probability, and frequency 
judgment models by prediction type.  The dashed lines represent the 95% HPD interval. 
 
Figure 12 is the visual result of each model’s within and out of sample prediction.    
For each model and prediction type, the distributions of the observed and predicted 
Ys are overlaid.  Each distribution is also plotted with its 95% high posterior density 
(HPD) interval.  This allows one to assess how similar the observed and predicted 
distributions of the judgment sums are.  Ideally, the distributions should be similar in 
shape.  Further, the predicted values should lay within the 95% HPD interval of the 
observed values.  Visually, across all three models, the observed and predicted 
distributions for both within and out of sample predictions seem very similar.  
Additionally, 95% of the predicted data seem to be contained within much of the 




Model Prediction 𝑌𝑌� 𝑌𝑌�  MSE 
Overall Within 128.55 128.54 151783372 
Out 125.02 128.23 638754187 
Probability Within 115.62 115.62 924694 
Out 115.72 113.38 139345576 
Frequency Within 102.69 102.71 151783372 
Out 106.42 98.74 1162715653 
Table 9. Descriptives of the distribution of outcome values for within and out of sample prediction on each model. 
Table 9 shows the descriptives of the outcome variable for within and out of sample 
predictions for all 3 models.  The discrepancy between the mean squared errors 
(MSEs) for within sample can be compared to the MSEs for out of sample prediction, 
which is often referred to as the mean squared predicted errors (MSPEs).  The ratio 
between these numbers suggests that the overall model was the least discrepant, 
followed by the probability model.  The frequency model appears to be the model 
most subject to possible overfitting of the data.   
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Table 10. Median effect size estimates with 95% HPD interval from the posterior distribution using a 3-factor 




Finally, the parameter estimates from the fitted samples are shown in table 10. Each 
parameter estimated includes the median value with its 95% HPD interval.  Notice 
that for the overall model, only judgment type and distribution do not contain 0 
within the HPD interval.  For probability judgments, distribution and semantic 
memory were the only parameters that did not include 0 within the HPD interval.  
Finally, for frequency judgments, distribution and episodic memory were the 
parameters that did not contain 0 within the HPD interval.  This somewhat converges 
with prior Bayesian model comparison findings.  Taken together, this suggests that 
the variance across all judgments are a function of the type of judgment and the 
distribution of which it came from.  For probability judgments, the data are more 
likely to be observed under models with SM included as a predictor.  For frequency 
judgments, though Bayesian model comparison results were inconclusive to weak, 
parameter estimation seems to indicate that EM may play a role in predicting 
frequency sums.  
Combined Analysis Discussion 
Results from Bayesian model comparison addressing the central core questions reveal 
several things.  With judgments predicted using a 2-factor memory model, results 
show support for RA in predicting probability judgment sums.  When judgments are 
predicted using a 3-factor memory model, the data for probability judgments are more 
likely to be observed when SM is included as an independent variable.   Across all 
judgment sums, both distribution and judgment type had strong evidence for 
predicting judgment sums.  Further, parameter estimates obtained from the cross-




information.  Cross-validation of each main effects model (overall, probability, and 
frequency judgment sums) seem to show good predictive quality for within sample 
prediction and decent predictive quality for out of sample prediction.   
Chapter 7:  End Remarks 
What Have We Learned? 
 In experiment 1, results revealed that retrieval from long-term memory may 
play an important role in predicting probability judgments sums.  Exploratory 
analyses suggested that general retrieval ability and its relation to judgment sums may 
vary as a function across judgment type and also within retrieval ability.  
Confirmatory factor analysis showed that a 3-factor memory model may be a more 
appropriate way to represent latent memory abilities.   
 In experiment 2, general retrieval ability was parsed into semantic and 
episodic memory.  The replicability of the findings from experiment 1 showed that 
again, judgment type was important in predicting judgment sums.  Additionally, the 
distribution of the alternatives choices also plays a role in both probability and 
frequency judgment. More measures were added in order to assess how memory may 
be best measured and to also take a latent variables modeling approach in predicting 
judgment sums. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that a 3-factor memory model 
is appropriate.  Structural equation modeling also suggested that the relation between 
latent memory abilities and judgments may be defined by which type of memory 
model one adopts.  When memory was measured using a 2nd order model, retrieval 




bi-factor model, semantic and retrieval ability predicted probability judgment sums. 
Specifically, the better the individual performed on these memory tasks, the overall 
magnitude of the judgment sums were more accurate.   
 Finally, combining data across both experiments provided converging 
evidence.  Two-factor memory models suggest that retrieval ability contributes to 
predicting probability judgment sums, and three-factor memory models revealed 
evidence for semantic memory predicting probability judgment sums.  Model utility 
was evaluated through cross-validation.  Bayesian estimation was used to obtain 
parameter estimates of predictors.  These estimates of the effects of independent 
variables across the overall, probability, and frequency judgment models showed 
good within sample prediction and decent out of sample predictions.   
Implications of the Distribution of Items on Judgments 
One of the surprising and consistent findings in this project was the support of the 
main effect of distribution on both judgment types.  The effect of the strength of 
evidence was expected to influence probability judgments but not frequency 
judgments. To gain some insights as to why this effect was found for frequency 
judgments, first we turn to prior research and then theory.   
The hypothesis that there should be no support for the effect of the distribution of 
items on judgment sums for frequency judgments stemmed partly from prior work on 
differences between probability and frequency judgments (Sprenger & Dougherty, 
2006).  Here, Sprenger and Dougherty found that the alternative outcomes effect was 
significant for probability judgments but not for frequency judgments.  They, 




comparison process. Interestingly, using the same paradigm and distributions as that 
study, the data from this current project did show the same pattern, as seen in table 
11. 
 
Table 11.  Mean judgments from data combined from experiment 1 and 2 compared to mean judgments from 
Sprenger and Dougherty (2006). 
 
The alternative outcomes paradigm was used as a design choice because the 
assumption is that probability judgments require one to compare the strength of 
evidence of the focal item to an alternative item during the judgment process.  In 
contrast, prior work on frequency judgments mainly point to factors such as 
representativeness, availability, and familiarity as the driving force behind their 
estimates. Why then, was there support for the distribution of the alternative items for 
frequency judgments? To address this, we turn to support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 








Simply put, support theory states that when making a likelihood judgment on A, that 
one will compare the strength of evidence of A over the strength of evidence of A 
plus the strength of evidence of the alternatives, which in this case is just B.  As noted 
before, we assume a comparison process for judgments of likelihood as it inherent 
within the estimation process.   
In the context of this experiment, we used a format that has been referred to as a 
natural sampling format (see Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).  Thus, one can view that 
we examined frequency judgments by asking participants to estimate s(A) and 
assessed probability judgments by asking participants to estimate s(A)/s(A)+s(B).  The 
strength of evidence, s, can be seen as the base-rate or frequency of presentation of a 
particular item.  
Prior research suggests that the biases that are seen in probability judgments of the 
function of the number of alternatives one considers and that the number of 
alternatives one can consider is constrained by working memory capacity.  However, 
let’s append to this the idea that judgments of likelihood are also a function of it’s the 
strength of evidence.  That is, judgments of likelihood are a process of two 
algorithms, the estimation of the strength of evidence of the to-be-judged item, s(A), 
and the number of alternative items one can consider s(B) where B contains the 
alternatives s(b1) + s(b2) +s(b3) +s(b4).  It could be that the frequency estimates, s(A), 
are driven by some sort encoding parameter which may result in differences in the 
sums between the two distributions.  Prior research has suggested several different 




overestimation of small stimulus frequencies and underestimation of large stimulus 
values (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978).  Other work 
suggest that people take into account, their uncertainties and regress their estimates 
towards the mean (Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005).  Our data are unable to 
distinguish between these two patterns.  However, it is interesting to note that in 
almost all cases shown in table 11, the order of magnitude for each item level 
estimate is higher in probability estimates when compared to its respective frequency 
estimates.  Thus, this may suggest that future work should consider that biases in 
frequency judgments may be driven by an algorithm that deals with the estimation of 
the strength of the item.  For probability judgments, two cognitive processes may be 
involved by adding to the frequency estimate of the strength, which involves the 
number of the alternative items one can consider. 
Implications of Memory on Judgments Types 
Finally, we now discuss the implications of these findings in the context of memory 
and how that accounts for some of the phenomena.  The relation of interest is the 
support of retrieval ability being predictive of probability judgments.  Specifically, 
semantic fluency.  Why may fluency matter to probability judgments? Again, let’s 
consider the design of this project, as well as prior research that has been conducted 
in a similar fashion.  Participants are asked to judge the likelihood of a certain item 
within its class.  This class, or superordinate category, in this design contained 
exemplars that were highly semantically related.  Thus, the ability to retrieve 
additional items could be facilitated by the semantic relatedness of the exemplars 




inconclusive evidence on semantic fluency.  This may suggest that different cognitive 
processes are elicited by judgment type.  Future studies can examine whether varying 
the semantic relatedness of a category of items that one will later judge would lead to 
more normative judgments.  That is, it could be that if there is low semantic 
relatedness between exemplar items within a category that the retrieval of the 
alternatives may be more difficult, leading to more subadditive judgments.  On the 
other hand, if the category contains highly related items, a judger may be able to 
retrieve a more complete set of alternatives, allowing for a more normative problem 
space and thus, more accurate judgment sums.  
Conclusions 
Taken together, findings suggest that the type of judgment and the distribution of the 
alternative choices of the to-be-judged items can influence one’s judgment estimate.  
Further, for probability judgments, individual differences in retrieval ability, 
specifically, semantic memory, seems to play a role in predicting judgment sums.  
Prior work has shown that frequency judgments are also subject to biases (Hertwig et 
al., 2005; Lichtenstein et al., 1978).  Our results from Bayesian model comparison 
were generally inconclusive in regards to each memory ability. Future work should 
examine the underlying cognitive mechanism that may drive these biases.   
  In so far that researchers seek to understand these phenomena in order to 
provide prescriptive models, the re-framing of phenomena, even if only descriptive, 
can help move the field forward.  Just as the judgers in our experiments are assumed 
to want to break down complex problems by use of simple heuristics, researchers are 




understand the behavior.  We are also subject to many of the biases described in these 
papers, ironically.  With that, is important to consider the not only the format of the 
information within the design of the experiment but also the type of measurement 
model when examining the relation between each memory ability and judgment sums.  
Because the interest of this project is on the unique contribution of each memory 
ability onto judgment sums, it is important to consider how memory is measured and 
quantified. Future studies on the relation between memory and judgment and decision 
making should consider how memory is assessed in order to account for the 
covariation innate to the various types of latent memory abilities.  The Holy Grail will 
be for us to explain why by use of these mechanisms in order to predict the biases 






Appendix A: Experiment 1 Supplement  
Descriptives of Measures and Composites 
Table 12 contains the Pearson’s correlations between each of the judgment types and 
distributions, the composites, and the measured variables used in experiment 1. The 
total number of participants, means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis are 
also included. 
 
Table 12. Descriptives for each of the tasks and judgment variables of interest in Experiment 1. 
Impetus and Justification of Exploratory Analytic Methods 
Figures 13 and 14 provide the impetus for conducting the exploratory analyses.  
Figure 13 shows how each measured task relates to probability judgments.  As can be 
seen, the three measures used to form the retrieval ability composite seem to differ in 
their relation to probability judgments.  This was also the case for frequency 
judgments, which is shown in figure 14.  In particular, DFR seems to have a stronger 
negative correlation with frequency judgments than the two fluency measures 





Figure 13. The relation between probability judgments and each memory measure. The grey area represents the 
95% confidence interval region. 
 
Figure 14. The relation between frequency judgments and each memory measure. The grey area represents the 




Common Factor Analysis vs Principal Component Analysis 
Both common factor analysis (FA) and principal component analysis (PCA) describe 
a set of p manifest variables in terms of f latent variables and assume that f ≤ p.  In 
common FA, it is assumed that each manifest variable is a function of f common 
factors and one unique factor. In PCA, each manifest variable is a linear function of 
principal components, with no separate representation of unique variance. In other 
words, CFA involves reduction of the diagonal elements of the correlation matrix and 
PCA does not. Thus, the main difference between both methods is the parsing of the 
variance.  Differences between the two methods will be small if the unique variances 
are also small (Joost C. F. de Winter & Dodou, 2014).   
Further, common FA is more generalizable in that if a set of observed variables are a 
function of some latent ability, then a subset of those variables can also be explained 
by that same latent ability. Thus, factor loadings can remain consistent for different 
subsets of variables.  PCA, on the other hand, create the components as a linear 
combination of manifest variables.  Thus, generalizing to other sets of variables is 
“awkward if not possible” (J. C.F. de Winter & Dodou, 2012; J. C F de Winter, 
Dodou, & Wieringa, 2009; Joost C. F. de Winter & Dodou, 2014).  
Factor Analysis: Exploratory vs Confirmatory 
The purpose of an EFA is to identify latent constructs or to generate hypothesis about 
their possible structures.  The purpose of a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is to 
evaluate the hypothesized structures of the latent constructs and/or develop a better 
understanding of such structures (Hancock & Mueller, 2010).  While we understand 




to use CFA in an exploratory manner, we found the degree of which our questions 
lined with EFA to be greater.  Further, the study included a variant of the Category 
Fluency task, which was newly developed and thus, makes EFA more suitable. The 
findings from the EFA will be used as a guide for any subsequent and/or more 
confirmatory methods.  
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring vs Maximum Likelihood 
Maximum Likelihood takes into account that the sample and not the population 
matrix is being analyzed and attempts to seek a solution that would best reproduce the 
population correlation values (inferential method and thus SE and GOF measures can 
be obtained). However, this method may not provide accurate estimates of pattern 
coefficients if the factors are weak and/or the sample size is too small (Briggs & 
MacCallum, 2003).  Further, this method is not recommended if the data are not 
normally distributed (Fabrigar, MacCallum, Wegener, & Strahan, 1999).  On the 
other hand, principal axis factoring uses a least squares solution which minimizes 
residuals between the correlation matrix being analyzed and the matrix implied by the 
factor model seen from the pattern coefficients and factor correlations. Principal axis 
factoring also is able to recover weak factors and more suitable for data that violate 
normality as it does not depend on this assumption.  
Rotation Method 
Because experiment 1 seeks to understand the unique contribution of retrieval ability 
over and beyond working memory, to the variation of judgments, when examining 




orthogonal rotation is preferred over oblique rotation methods, which produces or 
allows factors to correlate. The downside of forcing orthogonality on factors is that if 
the structure is actually correlated, then this would cause variables to load onto more 
than one factor. Further, in absence of theory, oblique rotations will generally result 
in more reasonable representations of the data because the dimensions that underlie 
the constructs in the social and behavioral sciences tend to be correlated.  However, 
our choice for orthogonal rotation lies both within our theory and our questions.  
Additionally, in practice, within EFA, it is acceptable to do both an orthogonal and 
oblique rotation and compare the results (Hancock & Mueller, 2010). 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Supplemental Results 
 





Figure 16. Results from the MAP from the EFA using experiment 1 data. 
 
 





Table 14.  Factor Matrices of the unrotated and rotated solutions from the EFA using experiment 1 data. 
Task Reliability 
Operation Span 0.645 
Symmetry Span 0.652 
Category Fluency 0.860 
Experience Fluency 0.735 
Delayed-Free Recall 0.625 








Construct Coefficient H 
2-Factor WM 0.305 0.717 0.741 RA 0.319 0.780 0.866 
3-Factor 
WM 0.314 0.732 0.737 
SM 0.394 0.768 0.866 
EM 0.400 0.633 0.741 




Table 15 contains split-half reliabilities for the tasks used in experiment 1.  The 
method used was the Spearman-Brown correction variant of the Spearman-Brown 
predicted reliability formula (Brown, 1910; Spearman, 1910).  Note that category 
fluency, experience fluency, and delayed-free recall, each had 3 blocks.  Thus, a pair-
wise correlation was done among these blocks and the average of those correlations 
was used in the formula.  Table 16 contains different indices of construct quality.  
The first is the variance extracted by that construct, which is the sum of the squared 
standardized factor loading.   The second index is the reliability of a construct, a 
measure of the reliability of the total score of the standardized indicators (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981).  Finally, the third index is Coefficient H, also referred to as maximal 
reliability and is the reliability of factor scores derived using regression methods 
(Hancock & Mueller, 2001).   
Appendix B: Experiment 2 Supplement  
Descriptives of Measures and Composites 
Table 13 contains the Pearson’s correlations between each of the judgment types and 
distributions, the composites, and the measured variables used in experiment 2. The 







Table 17. Descriptives for each of the tasks and judgment variables of interest in Experiment 2. 
 
Task Reliability 
Operation Span 0.668 
Symmetry Span 0.696 
Reading Span 0.560 
Category Fluency 0.765 
Experience Fluency 0.664 
Letter Fluency 0.901 
Delayed-Free Recall 0.759 
Cued-Recall 0.823 
Picture Source Source Correct 0.855 
Picture Source Correct Rejection 0.885 
Gender Source Source Correct 0.653 
Gender Source Correct Rejection 0.789 










2-Factor WM 0.356 0.617 0.652 RA 0.348 0.820 0.856 
3-Factor 
WM 0.328 0.590 0.609 
SM 0.551 0.785 0.798 
EM 0.323 0.718 0.793 
Bi-factor 
WM 0.263 0.477 0.604 
SM 0.059 0.153 0.160 
EM 0.185 0.547 0.608 
RA 0.222 0.744 0.824 
2nd Order 
WM 0.365 0.617 0.704 
SM 0.157 0.354 0.364 
EM 0.320 0.714 0.790 
RA 0.506 0.737 0.869 




Table 18 contains split-half reliabilities for the tasks used in experiment 2.  The same 
method used to calculate reliabilities in experiment 1 was used in experiment 2 tasks.  
Category fluency, experience fluency, letter fluency, and delayed-free recall each 
used the average of the pair-wise correlations between the blocks as input into the 
Spearman-Brown correction formula.  Table 19 contains the three construct quality 
indices resulting from the CFAs performed on the four measurement models in 
experiment 2.   
Appendix C: Combined Data Analysis Supplement  
Descriptives of Measures and Composites 
The table below shows contains the Pearson’s correlations between each of the 
judgment types and distributions, the composites, and the measured variables used the 
combined data analysis. The total number of participants, means, standard deviations, 










Cross-Validation and Parameter Estimation Supplements 
MCMC convergence assessments followed the initial convergence assessment 
procedures. This section will report the convergence of the samples used to make 
inference on. 
Trace, Density, & Running Means Plots.  Trace, density, and running means plots for 
all models were assessed visually.  For all models, these plots showed convergence 
was good for the parameters of interest. Again, while other simulations using a 
different number of iterations and burn-ins were testing, the overall estimates were 
similar.  
Posterior Scale Reduction Factor Plots.  The posterior scale reduction factors 
(PSRFs) for the parameters of interest were 1.  This was also the case for the 
multivariate posterior scale reduction factor.  The PSRF shows how each parameter 
and the development of the scale-reduction factor over time. Evaluation of these plots 
suggests that each parameter appears to have reached its target distribution and appear 
to be fairly stable upon converging. 
Autocorrelation and Effective Sample Size.  Overall, the effective sample sizes are 
pretty low suggesting that there were a lot of draws that were redundant or highly 
correlated with other draws within a chain. Thinning was then performed in order to 
account for this. 
Model Diagnostics.  An examination of the residuals was done and compared to 
residuals that would have been obtained using maximum likelihood estimation.    




using maximum likelihood were compared and across all models, these ranges were 
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